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1 Introduction
Modern large companies typically have separate ownership and management, which was
observed by Berle and Means (1932), and limited liability.
Separating ownership and management allows rms to commit to actions besides
maximizing prots. Some empirical evidence implies that such rms do not necessarily
maximize prots. For example, Amihud and Kamin (1979) support \Baumol (1958)'s
hypothesis that revenue maximizing is more prevalent among oligopolistic, management-
controlled rms."
Limited liability system is one of the most valuable inventions and institutions in
history in our modern capitalistic society. Today, most large rms in developed market
economies are limited liability companies. In some of these rms, managerial compensa-
tion is not very dependent on rm performance as measured by prot. In the economics
literature, Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that an oligopolistic product market is linked
to the nancial structure and show that limited liability may commit a leveraged rm to
output more aggressively. These arguments in the literature have only been applied to
an oligopolistic market1.
Historically, separation of ownership and management and limited liability were neces-
sary for European countries that traded with the Indies in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. This trading required large funds because merchants who wanted to trade with
the East had to send many ships to take goods back and forth, hire many seamen and
military personnel to defend the goods from piracy, and supply the ships with food and
water for a twelve-month voyage. In addition, shipwrecks were likely because navigation
was underdeveloped, safe sea routes were still unknown, and pirates were a threat. The
merchants who stayed in their native countries could not directly control and manage
trade activity in the East Indies.
The East India Companies in Dutch and England, established early in the seventeenth
century, were the original corporations, which today are an important type of limited
liability organization2. In those days, the East India Companies in the Netherlands
and England obtained exclusive trade rights with the countries of the Indies. In this
sense, each rm acted as a monopolist in each market. The Dutch East India Company
dominated long-distance commerce in seventeenth century, and the British East India
Company inherited its mantle in the eighteenth century. These two companies with
very dierent institutional origins and philosophies battled each other for global trade
1Shinkai, Ohkawa, Okamura and Harimaya (2012) examine the eect of limited liability on strategic
delegation in a Cournot duopoly with demand uncertainty. This paper explores the same eect in a
monopoly.
2Bernstein (2008) describes in chp.9 p.223, \Dutch citizens would consider it just as natural to own
a fractional share in trading vessels to Baltic or Spice Islands." In Israel (1989) p.22, \One Amsterdam
shipowner, at his death in 1610, left shares in twenty-two ships, consisting of one-sixteenth shares in
thirteen vessels, one thirty-second shares in seven,...and a one twenty-eighth share."
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supremacy for two hundred years3. The former company's structure reected the divisions
within the United Provinces4, so the Dutch government was inclined to act in the interest
of the whole nation and control the management of the company. The Dutch company
sent a governor-general with full authority over all of the company's ocers to Indonesia.
The British East India Company was even more decentralized, however, and acted less as
a trading company than as a guild. It allowed each of its members to trade on his account,
owning only the ships in common with other members5. Bernstein (2008) also describes
the behavior of the employees of the British East India Company, \the employee of the
East India Company treated its ships as their own, transporting large amounts of trade
goods for their accounts to and from Asia." From these historical facts, the objective
of the Dutch East India Company was likely to maximize prots, whereas the British
East India Company tried to maximize sales since the employee of it transported large
amounts of trade goods not only for the company's but their own accounts to and from
Asia.
The aim of this paper is to build a simple economic model to describe these limited
liability companies in their historical context and theoretically analyze the behavior of
these two dierent types of monopolists.
John, Senbet, Sundaram, and Woodward (2005) examine the product market choices
of a monopolist that is organized as a limited liability rm and discuss the relationship
between limited liability and market power. Under limited liability, if the total revenue
resulting from the realized market is higher than the total costs, then the monopolist is
able to pay the factors of production and make prots; on the other hand, if the total
revenue from the realized market is less than the total cost, the monopolist can declare
bankruptcy with no liability. They showed that a risk-neutral monopolist facing uncertain
demand with constant returns to scale technology produces more output, yielding higher
expected prots, when limited liability permits a costless exit. They do not discuss
dierent rm objectives in their research on the relationship between limited liability
and the market power of a monopolist.
Therefore, in this paper, we consider a two-stage monopoly market with demand
uncertainty under both unlimited and limited liability. In the rst stage, the shareholders
of a monopoly can choose their objective by designing either a prot maximization or a
sales maximization incentive scheme for the manager6. In the second stage, the manager
3Bernstein, W. (2008), pp.215-216.
4Bernstein (2008, p.220) says \The only national political institution in United Provinces in Nether-
lands for two centuries when the Union of Utrecht established the northern provinces in revolt against
Spain was the State General, which is considered as the Dutch government."
5Ibid. p.225. The decentralization of the British East India Company also made it more susceptible
to corruption than the Dutch India Company.
6In this paper, we do not assume that the owners of a monopolistic rm can choose between lim-
ited liability and unlimited liability. Ohkawa, Shinkai, Okamura, and Harimaya (2012) endogenize the
oligopolistic rms' choice of organizational form in the rst stage, and these rms then compete in a
Cournot fashion in the second stage.
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of the rm chooses her output quantity. We explore the relationship between the objective
of the monopolist and limited liability.
In the next section, we describe the structure of our model. In section 3, we consider
a monopoly in which the owners of the rm can choose either prot maximization or
sales maximization before the manager of their rm chooses the output of the rm in
the second stage under unlimited liability. In section 4, we consider the same two-stage
decision process under limited liability. In section 5, we evaluate the equilibrium of the
entire game from a social welfare perspective. The nal section gives concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a monopoly with additive demand uncertainty in which a monopolist pro-
duces and supplies a good with an identical constant return to scale technology. Under
limited (unlimited) liability, we assume that the shareholders of the monopolistic rm are
(not) protected by limited liability eects. The manager of the rm chooses output to
maximize expected prot (sales) when the owners of their rm choose `prot maximiza-
tion' (`sales maximization) as their objective, similar to the Dutch East India Company
(British East India Company).
The shareholders can ask for debt D from outside investors if the equity capital is
not sucient for nance production. According to Brander and Lewis (1986), the debt
holders are residual claimants in case of bankruptcy. Hence, the shareholders of the rm
do not care about returns in the bad state; they are only concerned with returns in the
good state. When the rm takes on debt, it is more inclined to follow strategies that
provide more returns in the good state and fewer returns in the bad state. That is, we
say that the rm is protected by the limited liability eect of debt nancing. The limited
liability eect induces the rm to assume more risk. As Brander and Lewis (1986) show,
the behavior of a leveraged rm is more aggressive than that of an unleveraged rm. In
this paper, we consider the objective choice eect in addition to this limited liability eect
in a monopoly.
The demand function is assumed to have additive uncertainty and to be inverse linear
p = a+ ez  Q = a+ ez   q; (1)
where a denotes the magnitude of the market and ez is a uniformly distributed random
variable with support [ z; z], a  z > 0 and with probability density function
(z) =
1
2z
; for z 2 [ z; z] (2)
= 0; otherwise.
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From (2), we observe that ez has mean 0 and variance 1
3
z2. We also assume that the
monopolist has a linear cost function
C(q) = cq; a > c > 0.
We assume that c = 1. Here, we make a key assumption in our analysis of a lever-
aged monopolist under limited liability. That is, we assume that the rm is nancially
constrained and must nance all or part of its variable costs by borrowing from its in-
vestors or banks, following Povel and Raith (2004). Most of the debt contract literature
assumes, as in as Brander and Lewis (1986), that a rm or an entrepreneur must nance
a xed start-up or project cost. In these papers, the equilibrium output and debt level of
each rm are not derived explicitly because of the nonlinearity of the reaction function
of each rm, as described in the analysis of the Brander-Lewis framework7. Povel and
Raith (2004), however, consider a Cournot duopoly in which one of the rms is nan-
cially constrained and must nance all or part of its variable costs by borrowing from
an investor and the other rm is not nancially constrained8. Under their assumptions,
each rm's choice of output uniquely determines its level of debt, making our analysis
more tractable. We thus assume in this paper that the debt level of the monopolist is
a linear variable cost function of its output under limited liability. We take the debt
assumed by the monopolist as endogenous. The monopolist takes on debt only to nance
its production. That is,
D = cq = q.
The expected prot of the monopolist is dened as
(q; ez) = R(q; ez)  C(q) = (a+ ez   q   1)q. (3)
Because the revenue of the monopolist (R(q; z) = (a+ z   q   1)q) is increasing in z,
we can dene the repayment function under limited liability as r  minfR(q; z); Dg for
any given realized value z of ez:
r = R(q; z); if   z  z < bz
= D = q, if z  z  bz, (4)
7In the Brander-Lewis framework, Ri (the gross prot function) is assumed to depend on the outputs
qi and qj and the random shock ezi with support [ z; z]. For example, see Franck and Pape (2008).
8As Povel and Raith (2004) state in their paper, \internal funds" refers the rm's own funds that it
can use to pay for variable production costs, w0  r0   F , where r0 and F denote the rms' retained
earnings and xed costs, respectively. Cleary et al. (2007) show that w0 < 0, that is, \negative internal
funds" are empirically relevant using 20 years of annual Compustat data, so we can expect that a rm
must nance variable costs in this case.
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where bz is dened as
D = q = (a+ bz   q)q = R(q; bz).
bz =  (a  q   1). (5)
Following the assumption of Brander and Lewis (1986) for bz, we assume that9
 z < bz < z. (6)
We assume the following to guarantee a positive output and a positive margin in
equilibrium.
[Assumption 1]
2(a  1) > z > 1
2
(a  1) and a > 2.
3 A Monopoly under Unlimited Liability
We consider a monopoly in which the owners choose an objective of prot maximization
or sales maximization in the rst stage and the manager chooses the output in the second
stage under unlimited liability. That is, the owners are faced with a two-stage decision
problem under additive demand uncertainty.
We consider the decision problem in stage 2. Given that the owners of the monopolist
chose prot maximization, we have an equilibrium in the monopoly.
From (3), the rst order condition is given by
@R(q; z)
@q
= a  2q   1 = 0. (7)
From (7) and (1), we can easily obtain each rm's output, total output, and expected
price at the equilibrium
qUP =
1
2
(a  1);
EpUP = E[a+ ez   qUP ] = 1
2
(a+ 1), (8)
where the superscript \UP 00 of q denotes that the objective of the monopolist is prot
maximization under unlimited liability.
By (1) and (3), we have
9This assumption guarantees that bz, the break-even realized value of ez, at which the expected net
prot (sales) of the rms after full repayment D exists between the closed interval [ z; z].
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UP = EPSUP = E[(pUP   1)qUP ] = (qUP )2 = 1
4
(a  1)2; (9)
ECSUP =
1
2
E[(a+ ez   pUP )qUP ] = 1
2
(qUP )2 =
1
8
(a  1)2;
ESSUP = EPSUP + ECSUP =
3
8
(a  1)2, (10)
where PS, CS, and SS denote producer surplus, consumer surplus, and social surplus,
respectively.
Next, given that the owners of the monopolist choose sales maximization, a simple
calculation provides us with the monopoly equilibrium. The monopolist maximizes its
expected sales (revenue),
ERUS = max
q
E[(a+ ez   qUS)qUS],
where the superscript \US" of q denotes that the objective is sales maximization
under unlimited liability.
The rst order condition is
a  2qUS = 0. (11)
From (11) and (1), we can easily obtain the output of the monopoly, and the expected
price at the equilibrium
qUS =
1
2
a;
EpUS = E[a+ ez   qUS] = 1
2
a: (12)
From (1) and (3), we have10
US = EPSUS = (EpUS   1)qUS = 1
2
(
1
2
a  1)a = 1
4
a(a  2); (13)
ECSUS =
1
2
E[(a+ ez   EpUS)qUS] = 1
2
(qUS)2 =
1
8
a2;
ESSUS = EPSUS + ECSUS =
1
8
a(3a  4). (14)
From the above equalities, we can derive the following proposition.
10To guarantee positive expected prot, we assume that a > 2.
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Proposition 1 A monopolist produces more in the US equilibrium than in the UP
equilibrium. Consequently, the expected price in the former equilibrium is lower than in
the latter one, the monopolist in the former earns less than the monopolist in the latter,
and the expected consumer and social surplus in the former are larger than in the latter.
Formally, if a > 2 and 2 < t, then
qUS > qUP , EpUS < EpUP , EUP > EUS, ECSUP < ECSUS, and ESSUP <
ESSUS.
That is, the owners of the monopolist always choose to maximize prots under un-
limited liability.
The intuition for the proposition is clear. The sales-maximizing monopolist in the
US equilibrium produces more aggressively than the prot-maximizing monopolist in the
UP equilibrium because the former does not consider its costs. This output expansion in
the US equilibrium sharply lowers the price and the expected prot relative to the UP
equilibrium. This result about the expected prot is contrary to the result for oligopoly
in Fershtman and Judd (1987). That is, the owners of the monopolist choose to maximize
prots under unlimited liability even though maximizing sales is more desirable from a
welfare point of view.
4 A Monopoly under Limited Liability
In this section, we consider a monopoly that follows the same decision process as in the
previous section under limited liability. We solve a two-stage decision problem in which
the owners of the rm choose either prot maximization or sales maximization in the rst
stage and the manager chooses the output in the second stage under limited liability.
At rst, we consider a prot-maximizing monopoly. We denote a monopoly whose
objective is prot maximization under limited liability with superscript \LP." We call
this equilibrium \the LP equilibrium" hereafter. Because the monopoly under limited
liability repays r  minfR(q; z); Dg for some realized value z of ez from (4), the monopolist
maximizes its expected prot after repaying its investors, that is
max
q
=
R z
 z[(q; z) +D   r](z)dz =
R z
 z[R(q; z)  r](z)dz
=
Z z
bzLN (a+ z   q   1)q 
1
2z
dz. (15)
The rst order condition is given by
8
@LP
@q
=
Z z
bzP
@
@q
[R(q; z)  q](z)dz + (a+ bzLP   q   1)q  @bzLP
@q
(bzLP )
=
Z z
bzLP (a+ z   2q   1)
1
2z
dz( * (5))
=
1
2z
(z   bzLP )
2

 q + z   bzLP
2

= 0.
Because z   bz > 0 holds from (6), we see that  q + z bzLP
2
= 0 holds.
Substituting (5) into this equality, we see that
1
2
 
a  3qLP   1 + z = 0, (16)
From (16), we obtain
qLP =
1
3
(t  1) > 0, (17)
where t  a+ z:11
From (17) and (1), we see that
E

pLP
  E a+ ez   qLP  = 1
3
(3a+ 1  t) . (18)
bzLP =  1
3
(2(a  1)  z) . (19)
We can show that  z < bzLP < z.12
Hence, we obtain the equilibrium net expected prot of the monopolist from (15) and
(19),
LP 
Z z
bzLP (a+ z   q
LP   1)qLP  1
2z
dz
=
1
2z
qLP  1
2
 
z   bzLP 2 (* (16))
=
1
z
 
qLP
3
=
1
27z
(t  1)3 . (20)
From (17) and (20), we have
11The inequality holds from Assumption 1. t = a + z > a + 13 (a   1) > 12 (3a   1) > 52 > 2 holds
because a > 2.
12From (19),z bzLN = 23 (a+z 1) = 23 (t 1) > 0, t > 2 and bzLN   ( z) = z+bzLN = 43z  23 (a 1) =
2
3 (2z   (a  1)) > 0 from Assumption 1.
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ECSLP =
1
2
(qLP )2 =
1
18
(t  1)2 ,
The expected prots (losses) of the bank (investors) at the LP equilibrium are given
by
EBPLP = E[r  D]
=
1
2z
[
Z bzLP
 z
f(a+ z   qLP   1)qLP   qLPgdz
+
Z z
bzLP fq
LP   qLPgdz]
=
1
2z
Z bzLP
 z
f(a+ z   qLP   2)qLPdz
=   1
4z
qLP (z + bzLP )2, (21)
so the expected social welfare at the LP equilibrium is given by
ESSLP = LP + ECSLP + EBPLP
=
1
4z
(z   bzLP )2qLP + qLP + 1
2
(qLP )2   1
4z
qLP (z + bzLP )2(* (5))
= qLP (a  1  1
2
qLP ) =
1
18
(t  1)(5(a  1)  z). (22)
Next, we analyze a sales-maximizing monopoly under limited liability. We denote
the monopoly whose objective is sales maximization by superscript \LS." Furthermore,
we call the monopoly equilibrium \the LS equilibrium." Although a sales-maximizing
monopolist has to repay all of its sales to investors when its sales less are than D, it does
not care about repayment when its sales are more than D under limited liability. That
is, the monopolist repays r  minfR(q; z); Dg for some realized value z of ez from (4).
The rm maximizes net sales R(q; z), dened by
R(q; z) = R(q; z)  r = 0; if   z  z < bzLS
= R(q; z), otherwise.
Hence, the expected sales maximization problem for the monopolist under limited
liability is given by
10
RLS  max
q
Z z
 z
R(q; z)(z)dz
max
q
Z z
bzLSR(q; z)(z)dz
= max
q
1
2z
q(z   bzLS)(2 + z   bzLS)
2
= max
q
1
4z
q

(a+ z   q)2   1	 : (23)
The rst order condition is
@RLS
@q
=
1
2z

1
2
f a+ z   qLS2   1g   qLS  a+ z   qLS = 0. (24)
From (24), we then obtain the quadratic equation of qLS,
3(qLS)2   4tqLS + t2   1 = 0:
This quadratic equation has two distinct real solutions,
qLS =
1
3

2t+
p
t2 + 3

;
1
3

2t 
p
t2 + 3

.
The former root violates condition (6), that is, z bzLS = a+z qLS  1 = t qLS  1 =
1
3
(t  3 pt2 + 3) < 0.
Consequently, the equilibrium output and bzLS are
qLS =
1
3

2t 
p
t2 + 3

, (25)
bzLS =  1
3

3(a  1)  2t+
p
t2 + 3

. (26)
Lemma 2 If t  a+ z > a > 2 and z > 1
8
(2a  5+p4a2   4a+ 9), then bzLS satises
assumption (6).
For proof of the lemma, see the appendix.
Hence, we obtain the ex ante equilibrium expected net prot of the monopolist from
(3), (26), and ((A.1))
11
LS =
Z z
 z
[(q; z) +D   r](z)dz = R z z[R(q; z)  r](z)dz
=
Z z
bzLS(a+ z   q
LS   1)qLS  1
2z
dz
=
1
2z
qLS  1
2
 
z   bzLS2
=
1
108z

2t 
p
t2 + 3

t  3 +
p
t2 + 3
2
. (27)
From (25) and (27), we have
ECSLS =
1
2
(qLS)2 =
1
18
(2t 
p
t2 + 3)2.
The expected prot (losses) of the bank (investors) at the LS equilibrium is given by
EBPLS = E[rLS  DM ]
=
1
2z
[
Z bzLS
 z
f(a+ z   qLSM )qLSM   qLSM gdz
+
Z z
bzLSfq
LS
M   qLSM gdz]
=
1
2z
Z bzLS
 z
f(a+ z   qLSM   1)qLSM dz
=   1
4z
qLSM (z + bzLS)2, (28)
so the expected social welfare at the LP equilibrium is given by
ESSLS = LS + ECSLS + EBPLS = qLS(a  1  1
2
qLS) (29)
=
1
3

2t 
p
t2 + 3

a  1  1
6

2t 
p
t2 + 3

.
5 Comparing the Monopoly Equilibria in Unlimited
and Limited Liability
In this section, we compare the monopolist's output, expected price, and expected net
prot in equilibrium under unlimited and limited liability. At rst, we obtain the following
proposition. See the appendix for the proof.
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Proposition 3 A monopolist produces more in the LS equilibrium than in the LP
equilibrium. Consequently, the expected price in the former is lower than in the latter,
and the monopolist in the former earns less than the monopolist in the latter, but the
expected consumer and social surplus in the former is larger than those in the latter.
Formally, if 2 < t, then LP > LS, qLS > qLP , E[pLS] < E[pLP ], ECSLP < ECSLS, and
ESSLP < ESSLS.
The intuition of the result is straightforward. From (15) and (23), the monopolist
maximizes its expected prots after repaying its investors for any realized value of z
in the LP equilibrium. In the LS equilibrium, the monopolist maximizes its sales after
repaying its sales to investors in the bad state ( z  z  bz), so sales are less than debt
and prots are zero. The rm maximizes its sales without repaying its investors in the
good state (bz < z  z), so its sales are more than its debt. Therefore, the monopolist
in the LS equilibrium produces more aggressively than in the LP equilibrium. The rm
earns less in the latter state than the former since the equilibrium price in the former
is much lower than that in the latter. That is, the owners of the monopolist have no
incentive to choose to maximize sales under limited liability.
Comparing the monopolist's output, expected price, and expected net prot derived
in section 3 to those derived in section 4, we obtain the following propositions. (Please
see the appendix for the proof.)
Proposition 4 (John, Senbet, Sundaram, and Woodward (2005)) Under As-
sumption 1, a monopolist produces more in the LP equilibrium than in the UP equi-
librium. Consequently, the expected price in the former is lower than in the latter, the
monopolist in the former earns more than the monopolist in the latter, and the expected
consumer and social surplus in the former are larger than those in the latter. Formally,
if 2 < t, then qUP < qLP ; EPUP > EPLP , and UP < LP hold, and ECSUP < ECSLP
and ESSUP < ESSLP hold.
The result of this proposition is that a limited liability prot-maximizing monopolist
produces more, has a lower expected price, and earns greater expected prots than an
unlimited liability prot-maximizing monopolist. This result is same as in Propositions
1 and 2 presented by John, Senbet, Sundaram, and Woodward (2005).
We can easily show the next proposition. See the appendix for the proof.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, the monopolist earns the most in the LP equi-
librium, the second most in the LS equilibrium, the third most in the UP equilibrium, and
the least in the US equilibrium. Formally, that means ELP > ELS > EUP > EUS
always holds.
From this proposition, we see that the owners of the monopolist are better o when
they choose prot maximization than when they choose sales maximization under both
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unlimited and limited liability. We also see that they are better o when they choose
prot maximization rather than sales maximization under limited liability in Proposition
3.
The result obtained in Proposition 3, therefore, theoretically supports the historical
fact that the Dutch East India Company, which chose prot maximization as its objective,
earned more than the British East India Company, which chose sales maximization as
its objective, so the former dominated long-distance commerce in the seventeenth century.
Proposition 3 also implies that it is more desirable for the monopolist to maximize sales
from a social welfare perspective even though it maximizes prot under limited liability.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this article, we built a simple monopoly model in order to describe two limited lia-
bility companies, the Dutch and British East India Companies, established early in the
seventeenth century. Then, we theoretically analyzed the behavior of these two dierent
types of monopolists organized as limited liability companies.
Specically, we consider a monopoly with additive demand uncertainty in which both
types of monopolist produce and supply a homogeneous good with an identical con-
stant return to scale technology. We consider a prot-maximizing monopoly and a sales-
maximizing monopoly under both unlimited liability and limited liability. That is, in
the rst stage, the shareholders of a monopoly can choose the objective by designing an
incentive scheme for the manager of their rm. In the second stage, the manager of the
rm chooses the output quantity under both unlimited liability and limited liability. We
explore the relationship between the objective of the monopolist and limited liability as
one of the most valuable inventions and institutions that human beings have created in
history, and we show that the owners of the monopolist are better o when they choose
prot maximization rather than sales maximization under both unlimited and limited
liability. This result seems to be natural and straightforward in the monopoly setting,
and it gives a theoretical explanation for why the Dutch East India Company rather than
the British East India Company dominated long-distance commerce in the seventeenth
century. Thus, we present a result that theoretically supports the historical fact that
the Dutch East India Company, which maximized prots, earned more than the British
East India Company, which maximized sales. From Proposition 3, although it is more
desirable for a monopolist to maximize sales from a social welfare perspective, the rm
chooses to maximize prots under limited liability.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: For bzLS to satisfy the assumption (6), we also have from assumption 1 and
(5)
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z   bzLS = z + (a  qLS   1)
= t  1  1
3
(2t 
p
t2 + 3)
=
1
3

(t  3) +
p
t2 + 3

> 0, 6(t  1) > 0, t > 2;
(A.1)
where t  a+ z > 2.
We can also show that
bzLS   ( z) = z + zLS
= z +
1
3

3(a  1)  2t+
p
t2 + 3

=
1
3

3  a+ 5z  
p
(a+ z)2 + 3

> 0
, 4z2 + (5  2a)z + (1  a) > 0
equivalently
z <
1
8
(2a  5 
p
4a2   4a+ 9); 1
8
(2a  5 +
p
4a2   4a+ 9) < z (A.2)
The lemma holds since we see that 1
8
(2a  5 p4a2   4a+ 9) < 0 for a > 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: From(17)and (25), qLS   qLP = 1
3
 
2t pt2 + 3   1
3
(t  1) = 1
3
((t + 1)  p
t2 + 3) > 0; since (t + 1)2  (t2 + 3)2 = 2(t   1) > 0 for t > 1,where t = a + z. So we
see that E[pLS] = E[a + z   qLS] = a   qLS < E[pLP ] = E[a + z   qLP ] = a   qLP . We
also see that ECSLS = 1
2
( qLS)2 > ECSLP = 1
2
( qLP )2. From (20) and (27), we have
LP (qLP )  LS(qLS) = 1
27z
(t  1)3   1
108z
(2t pt2 + 3)(t  3 +pt2 + 3)2
= 1
108z
 
t pt2 + 3 + 12  2t+pt2 + 3  4 :But we know that t pt2 + 3 + 12 >
0, the sign of sign(LP (qLP )  LS(qLS)) = sign (2t+pt2 + 3  4).
Since @
@t
(2t +
p
t2 + 3   4) = tp
t2+3
+ 2 > 0 for t > 2 > 1 and 2  1 + p12 + 3  
4 = 0. So (2t +
p
t2 + 3   4) > 0 () t > 2. Hence we have LP (qLP ) > LS(qLS).
From(29) and (22), dene F (q)  q(a   1   1
2
q) . dF (q)
dq
= F 0(q) = a   1   1
2
q = 0
and F 0(q) R 0 , q Q q = a   1; F 00(q) =  1
2
< 0 for all q. We can easily show
that q = a   1 > 1
3
 
2t pt2 + 3 = qLS > qLP since we have already shown it above
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and so for a > 2 and Assumption 1.Thus, we see that ESSLS   ESSLP = F (qLS) 
F (qLP ) > 0;since q = a   1 > qLS > qLP and F 0(q) > 0 for q > q, thus we get the
result. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: From(8)and (17), qUP   qLP = 1
2
(a   1)   1
3
(t  1) = 1
6
(3a   3   2t + 2) =
1
6
(3a  3  2a  2z+2) = 1
6
(a  1  2z) < 0 from Assumption 1,where t = a+ z > a > 2.
So we see that E[pUP ] = E[a+ z  qUP ] = a  qUP > E[pLP ] = E[a+ z  qLP ] = a  qLP .
We also see that ECSUP = 1
2
( qUP )2 < ECSLP = 1
2
( qLP )2. From (9) and (20), we have
UP   LP = 1
4
(a  1)2   1
27z
(t  1)3 = 1
108z
f27z(a  1)2   4(t  1)3g / 27z(a  1)2  
4(t  1)3 =  4z3   12(a  1)z2 + 15(a  1)2z   4(a  1)3  g(z).
So we have g(1
2
(a 1)) = 0, g0(z) = 3 (a  2z   1) (5a+ 2z   5) < 0, since 5a+2z 5 =
5(a   1) + 2z > 6(a   1) from Assumption 1. Hence g(z) < 0 and UP   LP < 0 for
z > 1
2
(a  1). From (10) and (22),
ESSUP  ESSLP = 3
8
(a  1)2   1
54z
(t  1)2(2(t  1) + 3z) = 1
216z
f81z(a  1)2   4(t 
1)2(2(t  1) + 3z)g
= 1
216z
(a  1  2z)(10z2 + 29z   8(a  1)2) /  (10z2 + 29z   8(a  1)2)  h(z), from
Assumption 1. we know that h(z) is a concave quadratic function of z and z > 1
2
(a 1) > 0
so we can show that z > 1
2
(a  1) > (a 1)
20
( 29 + 3p129) > 0, where (a 1)
20
( 29 + 3p129)
is the larger solution of the two real solutions of h(z) = 0, the quadratic equation of z.
Hence h(z) < 0 and ESSUP  ESSLP < 0, we show the result.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: From (13) and (27),
LS   UP = 1
27z
(t  1)3   1
4
(a  1)2
= 1
108z
f4(t  1)3   27z(a  1)2g
4(a+ z   1)3   27z(a  1)2 = (4a+ z   4) (a  2z   1)2 > 0 for z > 1
2
(a  1).
Combining the above into the results presented in Propositions 1, 3 and 4, we obtain
the result.
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